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Abstract
The initial wave of optimism in Turkey-EU relations following the 1999 Helsinki
summit has given way to a renewed period of scepticism and mutual mistrust between
the two partners. Based upon an analysis of the Kemalist political context and the
attitudes and positions of both Turkey and the EU towards each other, this paper makes
some suggestions on how to revitalise Turkey-EU relations. The EU could complement
Turkey’s EU accession process with a concrete ‘European strategy’ for Turkey
including trade, monetary, security and foreign policy elements. This could both
reinforce the rapprochement between the two and accelerate Turkish democratic reform
in the 21
st century.
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1.  Introduction
On 8 November 2000 the European Commission published its yearly report on Turkey’s
progress towards EU accession.
1 Based upon its conclusions, the Commission also drafted an
Accession Partnership document, recommending short and medium-term measures Turkey
should take in view of beginning accession negotiations with the Union.
2 Both documents
focus heavily upon Turkey’s political system and more precisely upon the country’s
shortcomings in the fields of democratisation and human rights. Official criticism is often
made of Turkey’s political system. Yet rarely do criticisms take into account the underlying
roots of particular problems or the wider context of the Turkish polity in which they occur. In
the author’s view, neglecting these critical issues could harm both Turkey-EU relations and
Turkey’s political development by giving rise to unrealistic expectations and mutual
misunderstandings.
The aim of this paper is two-fold. First, it attempts to provide an insight into the overall
context of political questions such as the Kurdish issue, political Islam, the political role of
the military, the Cyprus question and relations with Armenia, which are repeatedly mentioned
by European officials. Well-grounded criticisms and recommendations can only be made if
the specificity of the Turkish context is taken into account. Second, the paper turns to the
Union and suggests possible constructive next steps it could take to further relations with
Turkey and advance its democratic political development.
2.  The Kemalist nation-state and its implications
Many of the of the current political problems in modern day Turkey appear to be at least in
part directly or indirectly related to a specific interpretation of the Kemalist state and nation.
This particular interpretation has fundamentally shaped the political and to some extent
economic development of the Republic and has crucially affected the evolution of Turkey-EU
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relations. Two fundamental features will be analysed in this section: first the Turkish concept
of the state and nation and second the means through which the state has implemented this
principle throughout the decades of the Republic.
2.1 The traditional Kemalist view of the Turkish state and nation
Founded upon the ruins of the Ottoman Empire, the pillars of the new Republic of Turkey
were grounded upon and deliberately accounted for what were to believed to be the causes of
failure of the old regime. The Kemalist elite reacted strongly against Ottoman expansionism
and national heterogeneity. Heterogeneity was regarded as having fostered separate identities
within the Empire, having prevented the integration of peoples and having reduced popular
loyalty towards the state. They were thus seen, as having encouraged the disintegration of the
Empire from within as well as the latter’s weakness against external threats. Expansionism
was instead blamed for the repeated wars of the Empire, which ultimately led to its collapse.
Mustafa Kemal, later Atatürk, thus conceived a new vision of the nation-state in the nascent
Republic. He aimed to secure the unity and loyalty of all citizens through the creation of an
indivisible and homogeneous nation, whose territorial borders would not be subject to
alteration with the conquest of foreign lands. In the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne
3 in fact the
Turkish Republic renounced all claims to formerly Ottoman territories. This new notion of the
nation-state was regarded as critical to the survival and development of a new country in a
dangerous and unstable environment.
In order to create a single, indivisible and homogenous nation able to fend off all threats to the
state, Atatürk attempted to impart upon the peoples of Anatolia and Rumelia the 19
th century
French conception of civic nationalism and citizenship. The concept of statehood and
nationhood was new to Ottoman peoples. Self-identification had so far been a function of
primordial religious, family, tribal or village affiliations.
4 Loyalty to the state was an alien
notion, where peoples had merely regarded themselves as the subjects of a distant Sultan.
However, these principles were seen as prerequisites of a strong nation-state. Yet, within the
Republic a large minority did not belonging to the dominant Turkish and Sunni Muslim
group. Atatürk thus set out to square the circle of achieving political homogeneity within a
culturally heterogeneous society by adopting a civic understanding of the nation. The ‘Turk’
would be a citizen of the new Republic, and not an Anatolian Muslim from a particular class
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or ethnic group. All citizens would be first class citizens regardless of their race or religion.
Hence, no minorities, other than those mentioned by the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne, would be
recognised. Minority status entailed the existence of differentiated citizenship based upon
ethnicity. It was thus viewed in a pejorative light. The concept of civic nationalism and
citizenship are strongly present in the Turkish Constitution. Article 66 of the Constitution
states that ‘everyone bound to the Turkish state through the bond of citizenship is a Turk’.
The creation of a homogenous nation through the conceptualisation of civic nationalism was
aided by the Kemalist secularisation of the state. Again this was a reaction against the
Empire’s collapse. The entrenchment of religion within the political system of the Empire,
through the ulema, the tarikats and the millet system, was perceived as one of the Empire’s
weaknesses. It was regarded as hindering the integration of peoples and reducing their loyalty
to the regime. An acknowledgement of these realities had begun in the latter days of Ottoman
rule beginning with the Tanzimat reforms and especially following the Young Turks period in
1908-1918.
5 However, secularism was more radically embraced with the establishment of the
Republic. It became one of the principal ‘arrows’ of Kemalism guiding the development of
the new state. Early reforms included the abolition of the Caliphate, the Sharia courts and the
Ministry for Religious Affairs in 1924, the ban on the tarikats in 1925, the outlawing of the
fez and the discouraged use of the veil.
Kemalist secularism entailed two distinct elements. First, religion was kept out of state
decisions. Second, the state actively attempted to reduce the role played by religion in private
lives. Religion was viewed as a potential threat to the Kemalist nation-state. It was thus either
discouraged or attentively controlled by the Directorate of Religious Affairs. In the military
establishment for example, arguably the most Kemalist of all Turkish official institutions,
religion has been explicitly discouraged particularly in the last decade. Between January 1995
and August 2000, 745 serving officers were dismissed from the military predominantly for
suspected Islamist sympathies.
6
While Kemalism theoretically endorsed an enlightened vision of civic nationalism, in practice
distinct ethnic elements were incorporated in the understanding of the Turkish nation.
Specific ethnic undertones in the articulation of the Turkish nation began to emerge at the
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time of Atatürk. The population transfers with Greece on the basis of religion and the
institutionalisation of an education system insisting upon the Turkification of all groups
highlighted the distinctively ethnic elements of Turkish nationalism and nationhood. These
elements have persisted to this day. An extract of former President Demirel’s speech in July
1997 at the opening ceremony of the centre of Turkish Hearths illustrates this point:
The people who established this Republic are Turks. Where this country was
established is Turkey and the official language of this country is Turkish.
Everyone should pay the utmost attention to the concepts I have mentioned.
They are the guarantee of peace, trust and happiness in this country.
7
Kemalism in practice did thus not try to create a new Turkish nation based solely upon
citizenship and state loyalty. Rather it attempted to assimilate diverse ethnicities into an
ethnically Turkish nation.
Before proceeding it is however important to note that this potentially dangerous mixture
between civic and ethnic conceptualisations of the nation are not at all unique to Turkey. A
notable example in this respect is France. The revolt against the ancien regime and the
establishment of the Republican state led to the development of the concept of citizenship and
state loyalty, which in turn was accompanied by the practice of ‘Frenchification’ of disparate
groups. The internal contradictions of this model became increasingly apparent from the mid-
20
th  century particularly in view of the large immigration flows from North Africa in
particular. Jewish or Arab immigrants as well as Bretons and Corsicans increasingly called for
the articulation of their separate identities. To some extent these could be freely expressed
through the full respect for individual freedoms of expression, religion or association. Yet the
denial of full minority status led to persisting pressures for change towards a fully
multicultural society.
2.2 The Kemalist nation-state and the non-Turkish Sunni Muslim population
The combination of a theoretically civic understanding of the nation coupled with specific
ethnic interpretations of it in practice have proved to be a dangerous combination opening the
way to assimilation and discrimination. In some instances minority ethnic and religious
groups succeeded in integrating into the new Turkish nation and thus enjoyed the same status
of Turkish Sunni Muslim citizens. However in other cases, unwillingness or perhaps an
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inability
8 to integrate into the new environment have led to serious pressures for change.
These have at times been expressed through violent and destabilising action. A brief analysis
of the conditions of different groups, including Kurdish, Alevi Shiite, Christian, Jewish and
other non-Turkish Muslim citizens living in Turkey illustrates this point.
The Kurdish population
The Kurdish population of Turkey can be distinguished by the ethnic Turkish population
primarily by their use of Kurdish, of which the Kurmanci dialect is the most prominent. Up
until recently mentioning the existence of a separate Kurdish origin of Turkish citizens was
taboo in Turkey. Unlike Christian and Jewish communities, the Muslim population was
treated as a homogenous whole. Furthermore, citizens of Kurdish origin were regarded as
having Turanian origins and as such being ethnic Turks. They were simply labelled ‘mountain
Turks’, i.e., Turks who as a consequence of their isolated lifestyle in the Anatolian hinterlands
had developed separate dialects and needed to be re-educated about their ‘Turkishness’.
Elements of a separate Kurdish identity were erased by banning the use of Kurdish names,
restricting the use of the Kurdish language and ‘Turkifying’ place names in the Southeast.
The Turkish state also discarded any proposition of Kurdish minority rights for the Kurdish
population or autonomy on the grounds that it would institutionalise ethnic division and
prevent the Kurdish assimilation into the Turkish ‘melting pot’.
Some Kurds, particularly those living in the more developed western parts of the country
accepted assimilation into the Turkish nation. A few of those who did, succeeded in reaching
high-ranking positions in the business and political worlds. Former prime minister and
president Turgut Özal and former speaker of the Turkish General Assembly, Hikmat Çetin are
some examples. However, those who attempted to articulate a separate identity and rejected
‘Turkification’ were repressed.
Until the 1960s the Kurdish population remained largely unconscious of its separate identity.
The Kurdish revolts of the 1920s and 30s were effectively religious wars fought by the Kurds
against Kemalist secularisation and not separatist insurrections based upon the consciousness
of a distinctive Kurdish identity. However, by the 1960s, the Kurdish people, partly
influenced by the Kurdish nationalist movement of Mulla Mustafa Barzani in Northern Iraq,
began acknowledging their separate identity. The Kurdish nationalist movement was initially
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associated to Marxist groupings such as the Turkish Workers Party in the 1960s. With the
disenchantment with communism in the 1990s, the Kurdish nationalist cause became more
closely associated with some of the socio-economic ideas of political Islam.
The awakening of a separate Kurdish identity has been manifested in different forms. The
most striking and well-known movement has been the separatist PKK led by Abdullah
Öcalan. The PKK movement aimed at achieving an independent  Kurdistan based upon
Marxist-Leninist principles. These objectives were pursued in the 1980s and 1990s principally
through a vicious armed struggle directed by the  Kurdistan National Liberation Army
(ARGK) and the Kurdistan National Liberation Front (ERNK) against all perceived agents of
the state often including ordinary civilians and village guards. The Kurdish movement has
also included a non-violent ‘soft opposition’ including parties such as HEP, OZDEP, DEP,
DKP and HADEP. These movements (of which only the latter survives but whose
representation in Parliament is resisted) articulate the desire of many Kurdish citizens to be
recognised as such and to be able to organise themselves freely. No specific demand is even
being put forward for Kurdish political autonomy or for the federalisation of the Republic.
The Shiite Alevi population
While the majority of the Turkish population belongs to the Hanefi School of Sunni Islam,
approximately 20% of the Muslim population are Shiite  Alevi principally of the  Bektaºi
School.
The  Alevi population was generally strongly supportive of the Kemalist revolution and
particularly of its secularisation reforms. Representing a religious minority, the Alevis viewed
Kemalism as a positive shift away from Ottoman Empire based upon religious and thus Sunni
rule. But since the 1970s, the  Alevi’s separate religious identity has been voiced more
strongly with the growth of political Islam in Turkish politics. Through leftist political
movements such as TIKKO in the 1970s, the  Alevi population criticised state policies.
Criticism was often directed towards the Directorate of Religious Affairs that explicitly paid
almost exclusive attention to the Sunni population. The killings in  Gaziosmanpaºa in 1995
were a tragic illustration of tensions between the  Alevi leftist movements and the
fundamentalist Sunni  Islamists. The 1993 events in  Sivas instead clearly demonstrated
discriminatory state attitudes towards the Alevi population.REDEFINING TURKEY-EU RELATIONS
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The Greek Orthodox, Armenian and Jewish population
Small Christian and Jewish communities which remained in Turkey following the collapse of
the Ottoman Empire were accorded minority status in the 1923 Lausanne Treaty. As such
they were conceded specific religious and cultural rights in articles 38-44 of the Treaty.
Nonetheless, the ethnic undertones of Turkish nationalism affected their living conditions. In
the early years of the Republic, the state discouraged Greek or Armenian schools, it made
primary education in Turkish compulsory, it imposed high quotas of Turkish staff and capital
in firms and it opened several professions exclusively to ethnic Turks. One of the most
evident cases of discrimination against non-Muslim communities was in 1942 when capital
tax levels were set according to religious affiliation. This highly discriminatory policy on the
grounds of religion was directly aimed at harming the prosperous Jewish and Armenian
business in particular. Discrimination and community right violations were also evident with
the destruction of several Byzantine and Armenian monuments and churches.
Although the numbers of Jews in Turkey has been consistently declining over the decades, it
should be noted that the treatment of the Jewish population has been distinctively better than
that of the Greeks or the Armenians. The difference between the treatment of Greeks and
Armenians on the one hand and Jews on the other could be explained by two principal factors.
First and most important, the Jews were not only less numerous than the Greeks and the
Armenians, but unlike the latter they did not pose what was perceived to be a territorial threat
to the new Turkish state. Jews were not linked to a hostile motherland country at Turkey’s
borders. Israel was never to be an enemy of the Turkish state. The case of the Greeks and
Armenians was distinctively different. Turkey and Greece have been at loggerheads over
various territorial questions, and most importantly the future status of the island of Cyprus.
Discriminatory actions such as the expulsion of 6,000 Greeks from Turkey and the
confiscation of the property of 8,000 Greeks in Anatolia and Istanbul in the mid-1960s for
example was to a large extent a retaliation against the constitutional breakdown on Cyprus in
those years. The treatment of the Greeks in Turkey was the result of endemic ethnic
nationalism compounded by the specific impetus of the Cyprus situation. The case of the
Armenians is somewhat similar. The question of recognition of the 1915 Armenian genocide
and Armenia’s persistent reference to many Turkish provinces as ‘western Armenia’, creates
considerable anxiety in Turkey and fuels Turkey’s discriminatory treatment of Turkish
Armenians.NATHALIE TOCCI
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Second, the Jews appeared to be more ready to integrate in Turkish society. The Turkish
Jews, while retaining their specific identity, were generally sympathetic towards and ready to
integrate into the Turkish Republic. Many of them had taken refuge in the Ottoman Empire
following their persecution in Western Europe in the late 19
th century. As such they appeared
ready to integrate in Turkish society. This was not the case of the Greeks or the Armenians.
Particularly in the early days of Greek independence, the Greek state to a large extent
articulated a sense of national identity in opposition to Turkey given the successful struggle
for independence against the Ottoman occupation in the 1820s. In the case of the Armenians,
particularly since independence in 1991, the rehabilitation of a sense of national identity has
been aided by an opposition to Turkey as the ‘other’ and in particular by the international
campaign for the recognition of the 1915 genocide.
Other non-Turkish Muslim communities in Turkey
Other cases highlighting the issues affecting the treatment of non-Turkish/Sunni groups in
Turkey are those of several non-Turkish Muslim peoples such as the Laz from Georgia, the
Circassians from the North Caucasus, the Hemºilis and the Albanian population. All of these
groups have effectively integrated voluntarily into the Turkish nation. Like most other non-
Turkish communities in the country the use of their separate languages has been either banned
or severely restricted. However, the ‘Turkification’ of these peoples has been in most cases
facilitated by their willingness to fully integrate in the Turkish nation. Like the Turkish Jews,
many of these peoples had escaped persecution, in their case from Russia and the Christian
countries of the Caucasus. In Turkey they thus viewed themselves as proud defendants of
Islam in the mixed Black Sea area.
The integration of these peoples into the Turkish nation at least partially invalidates one of the
repeatedly stated Turkish arguments against autonomy for the Kurdish population or a move
away from the unitary state model in general. The Turkish civilian and military elite has often
voiced its concern that federalisation or political autonomy in Turkey would lead to a
disintegration of the nation-state because it would trigger separatist demands from a multitude
of ethnic groups. Yet the current positions of most other non-Turkish Muslim communities in
Turkey does not point towards the existence of many other demands for autonomy bubbling
beneath the surface. Apart from a few cases, there appears to be little ground for believing
that other non-Turkish Muslim groups would gravitate towards separatism following
federalisation or devolution in Turkey. The state’s outright refusal to contemplateREDEFINING TURKEY-EU RELATIONS
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federalisation or minority rights can be explained more by its conception of the Turkish nation
and its fear of disintegration, together with the instability of Turkish coalition party politics,
than by the objective assessment of the situation on the ground.
Hence, partly as a reaction to the Ottoman experience and the fear of disintegration, the
Kemalist revolution in Turkey instilled upon the people of Anatolia a particular vision of the
Turkish nation-state. This was to be a homogenous, fixed and indivisible whole. The
conceptualisation of the nation state as a civic construct and the secularisation of the state
fitted these requirements. However, in reality specific ethnic undertones of the understanding
of the Turkish nation were clearly visible. Attempting to assimilate the non-Turkish non
Sunni-Muslim population into this model has often led to discriminatory policies and human
and community right violations. In turn these led to important pressures for change. This has
occurred particularly in the cases of minority groups who either failed to integrate in Turkish
society such as the Kurds or who were connected to hostile mother countries such as the
Armenians or the Greeks.
2.3 The Kemalist nation-state and political Islam
Another source of pressure and instability has come from political Islam. As in the case of
pressures from particular minority groups, also political Islam could be in part explained as a
reaction against the particular interpretation of the Kemalist nation-state. Islam began
penetrating the secularised political system as a result of the politicisation of the masses in the
1950s and 1960s. The Islamic identity of the people was nurtured by the growth of the
Naºkebendi and Nurcu movements, aiming to educate followers in the conduct of a correct
Islamic life. Also the Imam Hatip Lisesi, which originally intended to educate and train prayer
leaders, increasingly played a significant role in the Islamisation of the public. They were in
turn strengthened by the increasing influence of Islam in the Turkish polity.
Aware of the persisting salience of religion as part of popular identity, traditional secular
ruling parties began endorsing Islam as a means to widen their electoral appeal. After
Republican Peoples Party (CHP) leader Ismet Inönü opened the party system to the Democrat
Party opposition in 1946, Islam began entering political discourse.
9 Both the CHP and the
Democrat and Justice Parties were effectively moderate ‘catch-all’ parties, which rejected any
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class or sectarian connotation and advocated a nationalist mixed economy.
10 Yet while the
CHP was linked to the state apparatus core, the Democrat and Justice Parties theoretically
stood for the periphery. As such, they attempted to appeal to the Islamic identity of the
people. During the 1950s and 1960s first during the Democrat rule and following the 1960
coup with the reformed Justice Party, Islam became instrumentalised by governing party to
attract the increasingly politicised electorate. Islam was also present during the military rule
of the early 1980s. Following the years of chaos and instability in the 1970s, the military
paradoxically attempted to re-educate the people and restore the foundations of the Kemalist
system through the ‘Turkish Islamic Synthesis’ (TIS). Retaining the concept of TIS, Islam
was again present during Turgut Özal’s Motherland Party’s (ANAP) rule in the 1980s.
Yet the introduction of Islam into the discourse of traditional governing parties did not imply
an automatic growth of political Islam and thus did not represent a sharp turn away from
secular Kemalism. Kemalist military and populist political circles recognised that Islam
represented one of the facets of Turkish identity and accepted the electoral value of reflecting
this in political discourse. The military in particularly selectively used Islam as an antidote
against instability and thus as a means to preserve the Kemalist regime.
An entirely different phenomenon, which instead has represented a fundamental threat to the
traditional Kemalist system, has been the rise of political Islam. Reacting against the Western
and secular veneer of Kemalism, political Islam began penetrating the Turkish political
system in the early 1970s and attracting increasing electoral support. In 1970  Necmettin
Erbakan formed the Islamic National Order Party (MNP), which was disbanded after the 1971
military memorandum. The party reformed in 1972 as the National Salvation Party (MSP).
The MSP played a crucial role in the coalition politics of the 1970s. Having succeeded
together with the nationalist right wing National Order Party in eroding the electoral base of
the dominant Justice Party, the MSP actively participated in several governing arrangements
during the unstable years of the 1970s. Given the historic rivalry between the dominant CHP
and the Justice Party preventing a grand coalition between the two, these traditional parties
formed coalition governments with extreme parties including Erbakan’s Islamic movement.
The electoral success of political Islam increased further in the 1990s. Following the years of
military regime in the early 1980s and the return to restricted party competition later that
decade, the reopening of party competition in the 1990s witnessed the phenomenal rise of
                                                                
10 Dodd, C.H. (1969), Politics and Government in Turkey pp.25.REDEFINING TURKEY-EU RELATIONS
11
Erbakan’s reformed Islamic party, the Welfare Party (RP). At the 1995 elections the RP won
the highest share of the vote gaining the support of 21.4% of the electorate. Following an
initial attempt to exclude Refah from government, the party formed a governing coalition with
Tansu Çiller’s True Path Party in 1996. Erbakan himself led the coalition until shortly after
the military’s soft coup of February 28 1997. At the 1989 municipal elections the RP’s
mayoral candidates were elected in five large cities and 100 towns. In the 1994 municipal
elections Mr  Erdoðan and Mr  Gokçek of the RP were elected as mayors of Istanbul and
Ankara respectively. Support for political Islam appears to have subsided since the fall of the
Erbakan government. Electoral support fell considerably during the 1999 general elections
and since then the reformed Virtue Party has been ridden by internal divisions. Nonetheless,
the party continues to attract an important segment of the electorate. Furthermore, the
nationalist and moderate Islamic movement of  Fetullah  Gulen has been attracting support
from over one million Turks in recent years, encouraging traditional Kemalist politicians
including Prime Minister Ecevit himself to establish relations with Gulen.
The rise of political Islam in Turkey since the 1970s thus remains a second threat and source
of instability in the Republic together with that posed by some minority groups which have
failed to integrate in the Turkish nation. Above it has been argued that both political Islam
and separatist pressures can at least be partly explained as a reaction against the conception of
a civic and secular Turkish nation. Both sources of pressure have represented seriously
destabilising factors in the political life of the country.
2.4 The Kemalist nation-state and the concept of ethnic kin in Turkish foreign
policy
The concept of Turkish nationalism and identity have had also a significant impact upon the
conduct of foreign policy. This has been the case particularly since the end of the Cold War.
Together with traditional security and economic concerns, identity has been an important
pillar driving the conduct of Turkish foreign policy. It should be clarified here that any form
of irredentism has been rejected outright by Turkey since its foundation. As mentioned
earlier, conscious of the problems caused by Ottoman expansionism, the Republic has
traditionally adopted a cautious foreign policy. However, while formally recognising that
Turks comprise all and only the inhabitants of the modern day Republic, Turkish foreignNATHALIE TOCCI
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policy has paid an important eye of regard towards what are viewed as ethnic kin in other
countries.
11 Foreign policy towards Azerbaijan and Cyprus are two notable examples.
Turkish foreign policy towards Azerbaijan
In the case of Turkish-Azeri relations, strategic and economic factors have naturally played an
important role in shaping Turkish policies. Strong Turkish-Azeri relations would allow
Turkey to gain a foothold in the strategically and economically crucial Caspian region. Most
important is the question of transportation of Caspian oil and gas. Turkey naturally has
significant economic interests in the construction of the  Baku-Ceyhan oil pipeline
transporting Azeri and possibly a portion of Kazakh oil to the Mediterranean coast with an
initial capacity of 1m bpd. Caspian gas transportation is also crucially important. Turkey is
interested not only in the transportation of Russian gas to Turkey through the Blue Stream
route across the Black Sea, but also and the transportation of Turkmen gas through the
Transcaucasus Energy Corridor. This may be further complemented with the transportation of
recently found offshore gas in the Shah Deniz field of Azerbaijan that could amount to 20
bcm/y. by 2010.
However, close ties between Turkey and Azerbaijan also have a strong ethnic kin dimension.
The newly independent state of Azerbaijan is linked to Turkey through close ties of language
and ethnicity. Such ties and particular language ties have strengthened following the collapse
of the Soviet Union and the increased contact between the two countries.
Ethnic ties together with the historical Turkish-Armenian enmity have strongly affected
Turkey’s attitude towards the  Azeri-Armenian conflict over the Soviet  Azeri autonomous
oblast of Nagorno Karabakh. Turkey has discouraged any form of irredentism in Azerbaijan
and has openly supported neither the idea of a land swap as a means of settling the dispute nor
the rumours in Azerbaijan proposing the creation of a Turkish-Azeri federation, confederation
or union. Nonetheless, following the Armenian victory of the 1988-94 Karabakh war and the
Armenian occupation of approximately 20% of  Azeri territory, Turkey has expressed its
overwhelming support for Azerbaijan. This has taken the form of severed diplomatic contacts
with Armenia and the blockade of Turkey’s eastern frontier with Armenia.
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Turkish foreign policy towards Cyprus
Turkish foreign policy towards Cyprus also illustrates the fundamental importance of ethnic
kin as a factor affecting Turkish foreign policy. Strategic security and economic concerns are
naturally important in shaping Turkish attitudes towards the Cyprus question. Cyprus has
often been described as the ‘dagger pointing at the heart of Turkey’, given its strategic
position only 40 miles away from the coast of Southern Anatolia. A Greek domination of the
island is viewed as posing an important security threat to Turkey, particularly by the Turkish
military. Nowadays the strategic military importance of Cyprus is probably overestimated.
Nonetheless, the eastern Mediterranean island is also critical for economic considerations
given the role of Cyprus in controlling the oil traffic from the Bay of Iskenderun, either with
the resumption of oil flows from Iraq following the lifting of international sanctions or with
the construction of Baku-Ceyhan pipeline.
However, ethnic ties with the Turkish Cypriot community and the deep-rooted concern for
minority Turkish Cypriot brothers on the island are crucial both in shaping public opinion and
civilian government positions on the Cyprus conflict. In addition to a military presence of
over 30,000 Turkish troops in northern Cyprus and the considerable financial support to the
economically blockaded north, Turkey has been the only state recognising the self-declared
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, it consistently supports fully Rauf Denktaº’ negotiating
position advocating the recognition of two separate sovereign states on the island and has
repeatedly condemned EU policy on the accession of the Greek Cypriot Republic of Cyprus.
It should be noted that the Turkish Government’s proposal for its National Programme as a
response to the Union’s Accession Partnership Document explicitly states that it would
support the UN Secretary General’s efforts to bring about peace on Cyprus on the basis of a
‘new partnership in Cyprus based on the sovereign equality of the two parties and the realities
on the island’
12. Despite EU pressure, Turkey has not shifted its position on Cyprus.
2.5 Resisting threats to the nation-state: repression and the role of the military
in politics
But the EU’s complaints do not simply stem from the Turkish authorities’ conceptualisation
and implementation of the nation-state and nationalism. They are related more to the
authoritarian and often human rights violating manner in which civilian and military  elites
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have resisted some of the real and perceived threats analysed above. The state’s imposition of
a particular vision of the nation has often been at odds with the demands of certain segments
of the population. This has led to an alienation of particular segments and subsequent
destabilising pressures for change. In reaction to such pressures the state has often adopted
authoritarian and repressive policies. These have caused important flaws in Turkey’s
democracy and human rights record.
The Kemalist revolution, like all revolutionary changes the in the past century, was conducted
in a relatively authoritarian manner. While paying lip service to the notions of republicanism
and to a lesser extent democracy, the latter did not feature highly if at all during Atatürk’s rule
itself. A radically new political system was effectively imposed upon the people, allowing a
paradoxical survival of authoritarian Ottoman modes of governance in the new Republic.
During Atatürk’s rule in Turkey in the 1920s and 1930s, and up and until 1946, the Kemalist
Republican People’s Party (CHP) ruled unchallenged given the closure of the party system to
multi-party competition.
Initially this autocratic style may have been explained and justified by the nature and extent of
revolutionary change. No revolution has been ever carried effectively through normal liberal
democratic procedures. However, authoritarian and repressive governance appears to have
survived to some extent throughout almost one century of republicanism. Traditional elites,
contradicting the spirit of Kemalist theory and determined to preserve the indivisible and
homogeneous nation-state, have often resorted to explicitly repressive measures.
13
The role of the military is particularly relevant in this respect. Since the foundation of the
Republic, law and tradition entrusted the military the key tasks of ensuring the survival of the
Kemalist state and nation against both internal and external threats. During its interventions in
the political life of the country, the military never attempted to install a permanent military
regime and always left peacefully following its interventions. Rather, as guardian of the
Kemalist system, the military attempted to re-impose through authoritarian means what it
believed to be the ‘right democratic order’.
14 Hence, the military interventions of 1960, 1971,
1980 and 1997.
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But apart from these extreme measures, the military retains a permanent voice in the political
development of the Republic particularly through its presence in the National Security
Council (MGK). The role of the MGK was introduced in the 1961 Constitution. It was to act
as an advisory body on questions related to national security and was composed of five
military and five civilian members. Its status was further enhanced under the 1982
Constitution by both adopting a broader definition of national security
15 and by stressing that
the MGK’s opinions were to be given ‘priority consideration’ by the Council of Ministers.
The MGK, is theoretically a consultative body. However in practice it has considerable
authority. While it may have difficulties in actively initiating policy, politicians will rarely
make a decision, which contradicts its opinions.
16 The judicial system is also strongly
influenced by the military, where up until June 1999 a military judge sat in state security
courts dealing with alleged ‘crimes against the indivisible integrity of the State, with its
territory and nation, the free democratic order, or against the Republic, whose characteristics
are defined in the Constitution, and offences directly involving the internal and external
security of the State’.
17
The presence of the military in Turkey’s political life sheds doubt upon the democratic
credentials of the country. But this is not necessarily because the military is not popularly
elected. In fact it should be noted that opinion polls have repeatedly shown that the military
ranks as the most trusted institution amongst the Turkish public. A December 1996 survey
reported that 81.3% of those questioned trusted the armed forces compared to 16.6% who
declared they trusted politicians.
18 Arguably the role of the military in Turkish political life is
questionable in so far as it has facilitated the institutionalisation of repressive measures and
human right violations. This has been the case particularly since the 1980 coup and the
acceptance of the 1982 Constitution, the Penal Code, the Law Against Terrorism and the
Political Parties Law. Many of the legal provisions included have been employed to curb
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through force and suppression any attempts to challenge the integrity of the unitary and
homogenous nation-state.
19
Both the military and political and judicial establishment in different ways and though
different means have been determined to resist all internal and external threats to the integrity
of the country and to fight all challenges to the Kemalist conception of the nation-state. The
authoritarian and repressive means to tackle what were and are perceived to be fundamental
threats to the nation-state will be explored by reviewing state policies towards the Kurdish
question and political Islam.
Resisting the threat of Political Islam
Turning first to political Islam, the most radical step taken to curb through repressive means
the power and influence of political Islam was through the ‘soft coup’ of 1997 which
effectively triggered the collapse of the  Erbakan-Çiller coalition government. By January
1997 Prime Minister  Erbakan began advancing more explicitly an Islamic agenda. He
proposed amendments of public office hours to facilitate the respect of Ramadan rules and
established links with leaders of Islamic sects that had been explicitly banned by Atatürk. The
military thus proceeded to draw up a package of reforms to curb the spread of political Islam.
On 28 February the 18-point package was presented at the MGK. The government was
effectively forced to accept the measures although it delayed their implementation, fearing the
alienation of its electorate . Pressure on the coalition from the military as well as from civilian
Kemalist elites persisted until the government resigned in June 1997.
At the same time, the military, political and judicial establishments took measures to dissolve
the RP in 1998 according to articles 68 and 69 of the Political Parties Law for having become
a ‘focal point’ in Turkish anti-secular activities. In addition, the provisions of Article 312 of
the Penal Code severely restricting freedom of expression were employed to ensure the
imprisonment of RP Mayor Erdoðan after a speech in Siirt in 1997, accused of having ‘incited
hatred amongst the people.’ The same article has been called upon to push for the
imprisonment of Erbakan himself. By restricting the scope of legal political activity, and by
curbing the freedom of expression, the state has thus confronted an essentially ideological and
political confrontation through repressive and undemocratic legal action. A secular
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understanding of the Turkish nation-state has led political and military  elites to confront
political Islam through legal exclusion and repression.
Resisting the threat of Kurdish separatist and cultural demands
Repressive and often human right violating measures have been employed to suppress the
emerging Kurdish identity and different expressions of Kurdish separatism. Up until 1991,
Law 2932 of 1983 banned the use of Kurdish in public life and penalised its use in private
life. With the 1995 reform of article 8 of the Anti Terror Law the use of the Kurdish language
is no longer an automatic legal offence. Nonetheless, many legal provisions remain which
severely restrict the use of Kurdish. Under law 3984, Kurdish TV and radio broadcasting
remain severely restricted, teaching in Kurdish is still banned and Kurdish cannot be used as
an official language in the southeast. It must be noted however that Undersecretary  Senkal
Atasagun and Deputy Undersecretary Mikdat Alpay of the National Intelligence Organization
(MIT) recently suggested that Kurdish state broadcasting could serve as a means to win back
the loyalty of the Kurdish speaking population, whose resistance to the state has been fuelled
by their unique exposure to illegal Kurdish propaganda.
20 Finally, as a result of the persisting
state of emergency in several districts of the southeast, the legal system also allows for further
restrictions of fundamental rights and freedoms in these areas. For example under law 424 of
1990; governors of state of emergency regions have the right to close printing presses, to
implement forcible resettlement of persons and to arbitrarily increase prison sentences.
Since 1984 the military has also been involved in physically suppressing Kurdish insurgency.
Over the last two decades with the initiation of the Kurdish guerrilla warfare ruthlessly
attacking both state agents and presumed civilian supporters of the state, fighting between
Turkish armed forces and PKK fighters both in Turkey and in Northern Iraq have effectively
claimed the lives of over 30,000 civilians and soldiers, the evacuation of more than 3,000
settlements and villages in the south-east and the displacing approximately 1.5 million
people.
21 The Turkish armed struggle against PKK terrorism can to some extent be justified.
The PKK is involved in terrorist activities and has caused considerable death and human
suffering. But the Turkish elite has also reacted strongly against peaceful political movements
attempting to articulate other facets of the Kurdish cause by accusing them of ties with
terrorist organisations. In the 1990s the state outlawed many pro-Kurdish parties including the
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HEP, DEP, DKP and OZDEP. It persists in imposing severe imitations in the political
activities of HADEP accusing the party of having ‘organic’ ties with the PKK.
However, it should be noted that Turkish public opinion by and large supports the state’s
attitude towards Kurdish separatism. It supports the state’s armed reaction against the PKK in
the light of the massacres committed by the latter against Turkish civilians. It also accepts the
attitudes towards the ‘soft’ Kurdish front given this is often viewed as a mere front for the
radical PKK.
3.  The future of Turkey-EU relations
An understanding of Turkey’s political context is crucial to a fair and realistic assessment of
the issues touched upon in both the EU Accession Partnership Document and the European
Parliament ‘ Morillon Report’ mentioning Cyprus, the Kurdish question and Turkish-
Armenian relations.
22
The above discussion has suggested that the often undemocratic and human rights violating
means of enforcing a particular interpretation of the Kemalist nation-state are a result of a
specific understanding of the past and a deep-rooted desire to create a viable political entity
within a hostile and unstable environment. Understanding the context of particular political
shortcomings and problems does not imply a justification of the latter. Nonetheless,
understanding is crucial in the formulation of realistic and constructive policies of
conditionality in Europe towards Turkey as well as the determination of realistic Turkish aims
and objectives vis-à-vis the EU.
3.1 Turkish attitudes towards the EU
Turning first to the second issue, the changes required in Turkey to effectively transform its
political system in accordance to EU models can only take place gradually over the course of
a few decades and will require a committed, strong and stable political leadership. The
political changes Turkey would have to undergo in order to comply with European standards
go well beyond the passing of important laws to abolish the death penalty, allow Kurdish
broadcasting or supporting the UN efforts to bring about a solution to the Cyprus problem. In
the long run they would imply all-encompassing reform to re-conceptualise the Turkish nation
and the functioning of the Turkish state. Such an extensive reform could only be successfully
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undertaken over the medium to long-term and would require a strong and stable leadership,
committed to the European goal.
The rhetoric of Kemalist civilian and military elite has historically been extremely pro-
European. Westernisation was and remains a fundamental feature of Kemalism. Again as a
reaction against the Ottoman past, the Kemalist revolution sought a mode of development
which drew the new Republic towards Europe and away from the Islamic and undeveloped
Middle East. Atatürk’s reforms in dress codes, his adoption of the Latin alphabet and the
Gregorian calendar and his formulation of a civil, penal and commercial code and a
constitution based upon several West European models all illustrate the founding father’s
attempts to set Turkey along the path to Westernisation. The military and political elite’s
unquestioned desire to join the EU is a persisting legacy of traditional Kemalist thinking. The
European Union, associated to Europe itself, is regarded as the ultimate aim culminating the
Kemalist revolution and is often present in domestic political debate.
However, moving beyond the rhetoric, Turkish elite so far have on a whole proved reluctant
to embark upon all-encompassing political reform. Since, the 1999 Helsinki decision to accept
Turkey as a candidate to EU accession, while economic reform has proceeded, little political
and constitutional reform has been undertaken. Debate in Turkey on the need for reform has
been ardent, particularly with respects to salient questions such as the abolition of the death
penalty, the liberalisation of freedom of expression and the closing down of political parties.
Turkey has also recently signed the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights and
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. This is no doubt
strongly linked to the Helsinki decision.
However, substantive political reform has been slow to come. The influence and
accountability of the National Security Council has remained unchanged, state security courts
have not undergone recent reforms in the last year, cases of torture and ill-treatment in prisons
persist, freedom of expression and association remain seriously limited and the Council of
Europe Framework Convention for the Protection of Minorities has not yet been signed.
Furthermore, Turkish elite criticised sharply some EU recommendations for domestic
political reform in the Accession Partnership Document particularly those concerning KurdishNATHALIE TOCCI
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rights. As Kramer puts it, state elite’s attitudes and actions suggest that what Turkey wants is
a platonic rather than a real membership of the EU.
23
As EU-Turkey relations deepen and Turkey is called to respond to EU demands with
substantial political reform, it will have to resolve itself upon whether it truly committed to
undergo a fundamental political revolution in order to become a full EU member. The
analysis above has attempted to show that preparing for EU membership would effectively
shake the Republic at its foundations, and is thus bound to entail a slow and difficult process.
Both the elite and the public should thus seriously debate the essence of the EU and its
compatibility with the Turkish political system and goals. So far political circles and the mass
media appear to have rarely debated EU accession in terms of its costs and benefits. Generally
they have tended to skim over the detail of how the European Union functions and how
Turkey would effectively need to transform the nature of its state and nation in order to adapt
to the ‘European model’. Even those who object to EU membership tend to do so in
opposition to the traditional cause of Westernisation. They rarely discuss whether Turkey is
willing and ready to endorse the EU model for what it truly is and not for what it represents to
traditional Kemalists.
Two crucial issues require particular attention and debate. First, is the question of sovereignty
within the Union. Several political speeches in Turkey suggest that Turkey could be an active
and co-operative participant of the EU like it is in other international organisations. However,
EU membership is a radically different experience from membership of international
organisations such as NATO. EU accession would entail the acceptance of majority voting in
most EU policy areas, it would involve a constant scrutinisation into the internal affairs of the
country and it would include some form of regionalisation at least as far as questions such as
structural funds and regional policy are concerned. The extent to which the transfer of
sovereignty to EU institutions would be compatible with Turkish traditions thus needs to be
addressed.
Another question relates to the transformation of the understanding of Turkish nationhood.
Within the EU, even countries such as France, mother of civic nationalism and adamant
supporter of the homogenous and organic nation, have begun acknowledging the complex
make-up of ethnic, linguistic and cultural identity within state borders. Turkey’s membership
of the EU would probably require a similar acknowledgement and thus an effective
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abandonment of the traditional interpretation of the Turkish nation. This could begin with the
full implementation of article 39 of the Lausanne Treaty, which while not mentioning
minority rights states that ‘no restrictions shall be imposed on the free use by any Turkish
national of any language in private intercourse, in commerce, in religion, in the press, or in
publications of any kind or at public meetings’.
24 Thereafter reform could include the
extension of the Lausanne articles referring to non-Muslim minorities to non-Turkish Muslim
groups such as the Kurds. The extent to which Turkey is willing to acknowledge its multi-
ethnic, multi-cultural and  multi-religious society and most importantly draw the necessary
political conclusions
25 from such a revised conception of the nation is open to debate. A
transformation of the understanding of the Turkish nation appears to be underway, although
the accompanying changes in the functioning of the state have been slow to materialise.
EU membership would effectively imply abandoning the traditional interpretation of
Kemalism and embracing a 21
st century re-conceptualisation of the Kemalist vision 78 years
following the foundation of the state. At this stage it is not yet clear whether Turkey is truly
committed to undergo what may be defined as a second revolution of the Republic. Is Turkey
willing to abandon many of its political assumptions and practices in order to seek an aim,
which implies a re-conceptualisation of the Kemalist Republic?
3.2 The unavoidability of political reform in Turkey
Important reasons suggest that all-encompassing political reform is inevitable and that
enlightened political circles in Turkey are acknowledging this reality. The EU accession
process and ultimate EU membership could thus serve as the appropriate anchor and incentive
for Turkey to undergo the necessary reform.
The Kemalist revolution set Turkey along the path of political and economic development.
Yet it succeeded precisely because Turkey was not yet a modernised country. The Kemalist
revolution was effectively an elite exercise that initially left the periphery, particularly the
rural population of Anatolia, largely unaffected. Up until the 1960s the normal political
pattern was one of low politicisation despite high electoral turnout. High electoral turnout
particularly in rural areas could be explained more by peasant votes reflecting intra-village
rivalries between local notables rather than by general political affiliations. Kemalism was
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thus able to impose upon the public a particular conception of the nation-state and a model of
economic development.
Yet the success of Kemalist modernisation has inevitably called for a reinterpretation of its
traditional approach. Modernisation and urbanisation in Turkey have triggered the
politicisation of the masses, the articulation of heterogeneous identities and the development
of a Turkish civil society willing to influence policy-making.
26 Furthermore, the Turkish
public has been exposed more recently to the various facets of globalisation, which has
further encouraged the manifestation of heterogeneous identities and demands. These
developments have provided the underlying causes of two of the fundamental challenges to
the traditional conception of the Turkish nation-state analysed above: the Kurdish question
and political Islam.
First, modernisation and politicisation can to a large extent explain the rise of political Islam
in Turkey. As the public became increasingly politicised the gap between Kemalist secular
policies and the demands of the peripheral masses for whom religion remained at the forefront
of self-identification increasingly grew. As Poulton puts it: ‘the new Islamists have been aided
by the very process of modernisation which the old elite initially thought would sweep them
away’
27. In addition, the highly skewed nature of economic development in Turkey as well as
the traditional centralisation, corruption and incoherent policy platforms of the traditional
ruling parties increased the appeal of extreme parties including Islamic movements. The MSP
in the 1970s and the  Refah and Fazilet Parties in the 1990s thus appealed to the Islamic
identity of many citizens and to the disaffected sections of the population in the rural areas of
the country, in the underdeveloped south-east and in the urban gecekondular. They capitalised
on the worsening economic disparities in the 1990s triggered by Özal’s liberalisation reforms
and mounting inflation by standing as the defenders of labourers and small tradesmen
threatened by unemployment and high interest rates.
It appears that for the moment the application of restrictive laws and military pressure has
succeeded in temporarily crushing the rise of political Islam. At the 1999 elections the
reformed Fazilet Partisi declined to 15.4% of the vote. However, suppression and force does
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not tackle the roots of the issue. Moreover, the problem today can no longer be addressed
through sound economic policies or reform of the party system. While increased employment,
assured social security, improved infrastructure and health and education services are of
fundamental importance, Islamic identity is an undeniable reality in Turkey which will
necessarily have to be channelled through a liberal democratic process in order for it not to
challenge the integrity and stability of the state.
Second, modernisation and politicisation have been crucial determinants of the awakening of
a separate Kurdish identity and the separatist Kurdish challenge. The politicisation of the
Kurdish public and the poor socio-economic conditions of the south-east have been a
fundamental factor behind Kurdish political mobilisation and rejection of the state system.
The Kurdish population mainly inhabiting the rural and undeveloped south-east has suffered
from high unemployment rates, the lack of adequate human and physical capital and the
general neglect of the agricultural local economy.
28 Their conditions worsened further in the
1980s and 1990s with the majority of state funds for the region being devoted to fighting the
PKK. Economic conditions may also explain why other Muslim minorities in Turkey such as
the Laz or the Hemºilis population inhabiting the more prosperous Black Sea areas have not
articulated politically in a confrontational manner their separate identity.
Deeply aware of the economic conditions of the south-east, in recent years political elite in
Ankara have argued that economic instruments should be employed to resolve the Kurdish
problem. By December 2000 civilian governments encouraged by the military had proposed a
total of seventeen development packages for the south-east.
29 These are no doubt required.
Yet hoping to address the issue today solely through economic development is probably an
illusion and a means of postponing necessary political reforms. While uneven economic
development may have been a primary cause behind the formation of a separate Kurdish
identity, that identity today exists for many Kurdish citizens and will not simply disappear
through increased economic well being. Political reform aimed at channelling Kurdish
demands through democratic processes is inescapable. In this respect, the liberalisation of the
activities of moderate pro-Kurdish political parties, the full implementation of article 39 of the
Lausanne Treaty mentioned above, as well as the allowance of Kurdish broadcasting and
education are absolute priorities.
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3.3 EU policies towards Turkey
Above the argument has been made that Turkey’s EU membership would entail an effective
revolution in the traditional Kemalist political system. However, the unavoidability of
political reform in the modernising country suggests that the EU anchor could serve as an
incentive to carry through necessary political developments in Turkey. In order for this to be
the case it is fundamental that the Union adopts a frank and constructive attitude towards this
candidate, provided it is serious about its membership prospects.
In the Commission Progress Reports since 1998 and the 2000 Accession Partnership
Document, the EU made specific recommendations for political reform in Turkey. With
respect to internal political problems in Turkey, the Commission demands that in the short
term the proper functioning of state security courts should be ensured while in the medium
term the MGK should be transformed into a de facto advisory body. On the question of
torture and ill treatment, the Commission mentions the need to comply with the standards set
by the European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and the ECHR and calls for
intensified efforts to strengthen human rights education for police officers. On capital
punishment, the Commission calls for the continuation of its effective moratorium in the short
run and its abolition in the medium term. Turning to freedom of association and expression,
the Commission suggests that in the short term, Turkey should provide the legal guarantees to
ensure the respect of these freedoms in line with article 10 of the ECHR. On minority rights,
the Commission calls Turkey to legalise Kurdish broadcasting in the short-term and lift all
states of emergency in the south-east in the medium-term.
All of the above recommendations are on a whole both desirable and realistic. However, so
far EU pressure has failed to induce all-encompassing political reform in Turkey. In order for
European recommendations and thus policies of political conditionality to be effective, the
incentive of membership must be credible. Credibility requires trust between donor and
recipient, clarity of donor objectives, and a sense of immediacy about the promised reward.
30
Arguably all three conditions are not met in the case of Turkey-EU relations.
First, the apparent lack of understanding and blanket criticism in many European capitals of
the Turkish political system have led to a deterioration of trust between Turkey and the EU
and scepticism in Turkey regarding EU intentions. European political circles have frequently
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displayed an over-sympathetic attitude towards extreme religious and separatist movements in
Turkey while being overly critical of the state’s confrontation of these problems. Such
positions have illustrated Europe’s profound lack of understanding of Turkish problems, they
have triggered a defensive and obstinate Turkish counter-reaction and have thus reduced trust
between the two parties. Political elite in Turkey have tended to view EU attitudes as
expressions of racism and exclusionism, thus casting doubt upon the credibility of  EU’s
policies of conditionality.
Second, the EU’s ambivalent attitudes towards Turkey’s candidacy have highlighted its lack
of clarity regarding the future role of Turkey in the Union. Contrasting voices within Europe
on the questions of Turkey’s EU membership ranging from the German Christian Democrat
stance to the more favourable British or Italian positions continuously send mixed signals to
Turkey. These are reinforced by the apparently incoherent EU positions on this question. The
1997 Luxembourg summit denied Turkey its long desired candidate status, which was finally
granted at the 1999 Helsinki summit. However since then the wave of optimism within
Europe regarding Turkey’s membership has faded. In addition relations between the two have
deteriorated with the ongoing crisis regarding Turkey’s role in the nascent ESDP, with
inclusion of the Cyprus issue in the Accession Partnership Document, with the recognition of
the ‘Armenian genocide’ in the European Parliament and in France and finally with the
neglect of Turkey at the December EU Nice Summit. As a consequence Turkey has been
recently accusing the EU of applying double standards to Turkey reducing its incentives to
comply to EU political recommendations.
Third is the issue of timing. Membership can indeed be a powerful incentive to induce radical
political reform in Turkey. However, the changes that Turkey would have to undergo in order
to be ready for EU membership as well as the adjustments the EU itself would have to make
in order to accommodate Turkey in its structures imply a relatively long time horizon for
Turkey’s EU membership. Timing affects the value of a promised benefit, and value is critical
to ensure that a promised benefit acts as an incentive for reform. Hence, membership alone,
while remaining a long-term prospect of utmost importance both for Turkey and the EU, is
insufficient to promote necessary political reform in Turkey. If Europe is indeed serious about
opening its doors to Turkey and promoting democratic reform in the country, more needs to
be done than simply offering a distant and uncertain prospect of membership and imposing a
long list of wide-ranging political conditions to be fulfilled by the candidate in the short and
medium terms.NATHALIE TOCCI
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This is not to say that EU conditions should not be imposed on Turkey, that conditions can be
subject to negotiations, or that the accession process should replaced by a faster track to full
membership open uniquely to Turkey. Such a policy would indeed imply EU double
standards and would simply serve to discourage internal reform in Turkey. On the contrary,
action should be taken to make the existing accession process truly credible and to encourage
political reform in Turkey in accordance to existing EU conditions.
4.  Policy issues
In addition to the conditional incentive of EU membership, Turkey-EU relations should be
strengthened in the short and medium terms through other avenues in order to encourage
extensive political reform in Turkey. This would send signals to Turkey regarding the clarity
of EU objectives, it would increase Turkey’s trust of the Union and it would raise the value of
the conditional rewards expected by Turkey given the immediacy of these complementary EU
policy actions.
The Luxembourg European Summit proposed that a ‘special European strategy’ should be
offered to Turkey instead of EU candidacy. This proposal led to sharp criticism in Turkey.
This was primarily because Turkey saw itself de-coupled from the enlargement process and
because no concrete proposals were made regarding the possible substance of this ‘strategy’.
As a result Turkey refused to participate in the 1997 European Conference and proceeded
with the integration with the ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’ (TRNC).
31 Excluding
Turkey from the accession process and proposing an empty ‘European strategy’ in its place
confirmed many views in Turkey on European prejudiced attitudes towards Muslim Turkey.
However, the concept of a European strategy could be a useful complement to Turkey’s EU
accession process. Provided the option of membership is kept open and a substantial
European strategy can be articulated in the short and medium terms as a complement to long-
term EU membership, the latter could significantly strengthen Turkey-EU relations and
further democratic reform in Turkey.
It is fundamental to stress the concept of complementarity. A European Strategy for Turkey
and Turkey’s accession process could be complementary in two distinct ways. First, a
European Strategy would speed up the accession process by encouraging political reform in
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Turkey. A European strategy would serve to increase the perceived commitment of the EU
towards Turkey, build trust between the two parties and increase the value of Turkey-EU
relations by reducing the time perspective for the receipt of promised benefits. These effects
would in turn increase the incentive in Turkey to undergo substantial political reform. Reform
in turn would shorten Turkey’s path to the EU. As such a European strategy would be
complementary to the accession process.
Second, a European strategy could be complementary to the accession process by devising
ways in which Turkey could become a virtual EU member in particular policy domains, prior
to its full EU membership. By integrating with the EU in several policy spheres through
specifically designed formulas, Turkey’s full transition towards Europe could be made
smoother and quicker.
But what could an adequate and complementary European Strategy consist of? Since the 1997
Luxembourg Summit, the European Commission has developed the idea of a ‘European
Strategy for Turkey’ by proposing a development of the 1995 Turkey-EU customs union. On
4 March 1998 the Commission proposed the extension of the Customs Union to the
agricultural and services sectors and the strengthening of co-operation in several fields. The
European strategy regulations for Turkey were set at 150 million euro for the period 2000-
2002. These measures are no doubt constructive. The greatest share of EU imports from
Turkey come from agricultural goods. In 1999 agricultural and textile imports from Turkey
added up to 14% of total EU imports, compared to machinery, transport material, chemical
products and fuels which together added up to 3.6% of total EU imports.
32 Financial transfers
are also necessary given they had been blocked for the past five years by the Greek veto in the
Council of Ministers.
Deepening integration in trade matters in this way would be particularly important given the
widespread scepticism in Turkey regarding the customs union. In a recent article on Turkish
Daily News, T. Duggan argued that given the Union’s relative gain from the customs union
with Turkey, it would be against the latter’s economic interests to upgrade Turkey to full
membership. With Turkey’s full EU membership, the Union would lose many of its trade
advantages. Hence, Duggan’s conclusion: ‘ it seems much more profitable for the EU to keep
things exactly as they are with client, Turkey, still knocking on the EU door for membership,
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while the EU laps up the cream through trade imbalance’.
33 The correctness of this argument
is highly debatable, but it nonetheless clearly highlights the frequent scepticism and suspicion
of the EU in Turkey. Extending and modifying the customs union on terms more favourable
to Turkey would thus not only bring economic gains to the latter but would also improve trust
and understanding between the two partners. This in turn would contribute to a reduction of
the EU’s credibility problem in its policies towards Turkey.
However an extension of the customs union is insufficient. A substantial ‘European strategy’
for Turkey, which would complement the accession process and provide strong incentives for
Turkey’s democratic reform would require additional elements. Below some suggestions are
made regarding the possible further chapters of a ‘European strategy’ for Turkey.
4.1 Monetary Policy
34
Before the final crisis Turkey had been implementing its latest IMF stand-by agreement for
just over one year, with the stated aim to reduce inflation to single digit levels over the next
two years. Until the crises of late 2000- early 2001, the implementation of this programme
had been the most successful of recent decades (Turkey has had numerous IMF programmes,
which had all gone astray). Inflation was reduced from an average of around 100% during the
late 1990s, to about 70% in 1999 and 40% in 2000 and was forecasted to reduce further to
20% in 2001. However, following the 18 February financial crisis inflation forecasts for 2001
and 2002 were scaled up to 46.1% and 20% respectively.
Despite the merits of the IMF programme, the latter had serious shortcomings. In particular,
the quasi currency board adopted proved a failure. Turkey had chosen a quasi-currency board
regime whereby the lira exchange rate was determined with respect to a basket that contained
one dollar and 0.7 euro. The authorities then published a path for the value of the TRL in
terms of this basket for the entire length of the programme (over one year at the start). The
pre-programmed rate of depreciation was set at first only, in order to offset the planned rate of
inflation.
The system suffered from the classic problems of a stabilisation programme based on a fixed
exchange rate. The exchange rate fixing was perceived as credible, at least in the short run by
financial markets. After the initiation of the IMF programme banks began borrowing dollars
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at low rates and investing them extensively in high yielding Turkish T-bills on a large scale.
The banking system’s net foreign assets thus spiralled downwards, off balance sheet forward
transactions left the banks in an open position. As long as the exchange rate held this was
extremely profitable. But the exposure of banks made them vulnerable to changing financial
market conditions. The inflation programme became also more vulnerable because trade
unions took advantage of the initial honeymoon period of high credibility to demand higher
wages. This burdened the public sector budget and lead to higher than programmed inflation.
The first, three week long financial crisis beginning on 17 November 2000, emerged when the
exposure of large-scale corruption in the banking system led to a fall in confidence, i.e. a rise
in interest rates. Many banks thus made large losses on their holdings of longer dated T-bills.
The central bank attempted to rescue the banking system at the expense of the quasi currency
board arrangement causing many small and medium-sized banks to be squeezed both from the
interest and exchange rate sides. The situation slightly improved following the announcement
of an IMF support package providing an additional $7.5bn credit.
But recovery did not last. A second crisis was sparked in 17 February 2001, following an
argument between President Sezer and Prime Minister Ecevit during the regular monthly
meeting of the National Security Council. This second financial crisis triggering the worst
economic crisis in the history of the Republic is strictly linked to the corrupt Turkish political
system. The IMF rescue package allowed the termination of the November 2000 crisis
without encouraging the political class to tackle the fundamental roots of the problem, i.e.,
corruption. The persisting illegal practices of the collapsed private banks created additional
dangerous exposure for the government controlled banks, and cast greater doubt upon the
latter’s management and lending standards. The scene was set for the second crisis. It should
in fact be noted that the issue of corruption rested at the core of the argument during the NSC
meeting. Former Judge and current President Sezer as well as military circles had identified
corruption as a major security threat in the country. The Operation White Energy launched by
the Turkish General Staff in January 2001, and aiming to eradicate corrupt practices in the
energy sector quickly identified names of high ranking exponents in governing parties.
Unsurprisingly the government chose not to actively pursue the matter. The argument erupted
during the MGK meeting when Sezer confronted the Ecevit directly with this evidence.
The crisis that followed constitutes a classical textbook example of the self-reinforcing
mechanisms that can operate in financial markets. The Turkish programme was not obviouslyNATHALIE TOCCI
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doomed as long as confidence was high (and thus interest rates low). However, at low
confidence, and thus high interest rates, the situation became suddenly untenable. Interest
rates shot up to over 100% and the currency devalued at one point by almost 100 % as well.
The sky-high interest rates, even if they did not persist had two effects: a collapse in domestic
demand and the explosion of the fiscal deficit. The latter forced the government to raise taxes
as the economy contracted. This is the opposite of what it would normally do. But given that
investor confidence had to be maintained at all costs in such a situation, the government had
no alternative. The combined effect of the crisis plus the large scale corruption in the banking
system is that now the debt to GDP ratio stands at close to 100%. Turkey is thus even more
vulnerable to speculative attacks.
In May-June 2001, the Turkish government of Turkey agreed upon a wide-ranging reform
programme. Not surprisingly the structural part of Minister  Derviº’s programme focuses
heavily upon the reduction of government role in the sectors such as sugar, tobacco, natural
gas, civil aviation and telecoms. The programme also includes a proposed Central Bank Law
that would also enable independent monetary policy-making. The underlying cause of the
problem i.e., political interference in the economy and corruption has been identified. The
question remains whether sufficient political commitment exists to deliver the required
measures. Vested interests in the standing system in addition to the public pressure to reduce
the pain of adjustment shed doubt upon its implementability.
As argued by Professor Steve Hanke
35 these financial crisis would not have occurred with a
full currency board. A currency board would have prevented the government from acting as
lender of last resort and would have forced banks to reform. As put by Marcel Cassard from
Deutsche Bank ‘the liquidity crisis is a crisis of confidence’ rather than of fundamentals
strengthening the case for a credible currency board further’.
36
In a previous CEPS paper
37 it was argued that an alternative to the quasi current currency
board, compatible with  Hanke’s position would be that to ‘euroise’ the Turkish economy.
This could be achieved through the immediate introduction of a full currency board under
which the Central Bank would be ready to exchange any amounts of lira against euro at a
fixed rate. This rate would not be changed until 2002, at which date all lira would be
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exchanged against the euro notes and coins. It is interesting to note that at present exchange
rates the currency board could easily be fixed at 1 million TRL to 1 euro so that one could
have a conveniently round convergence rate.
Clearly, full ‘euroisation’ would imply the loss of the exchange rate instrument and the total
loss of control over monetary policy until EU membership is attained. However, important
arguments suggest the overall desirability of ‘euroisation’ in the Turkish economy. Within a
context of potential political instability and corruption as in Turkey, long-lasting successful
internal reform is an extremely difficult task. An IMF assisted programme, which relies
exclusively on internal policy reform, is unlikely to succeed entirely within an unstable and
corrupt political context. The recent financial crises in Turkey despite a relatively sound
conduct of macroeconomic policy vividly illustrate this argument. The adoption of a foreign
currency would transform the Turkish political economy making it impossible to support loss-
making public or private enterprises. By renouncing control over monetary policy the
government could engage seriously in a wide-ranging reform of the banking system.
Moreover, countries with weak fiscal and monetary regimes such as Turkey are the ones,
which stand to gain the most from ‘ euroisation’.
38 The literature on speculative attacks
emphasises that when highly indebted countries such as Turkey lose credibility in the eyes of
investors, they have to pay a risk premium in terms of higher interest rates. The higher debt
service this entails makes it more likely that the government will attempt to reduce the real
value of the debt through surprise inflation. This expectation increases the risk premium
further triggering a vicious circle of rising interest rates until the government caves in. How
can a virtuous circle be set in motion leading to a more desirable equilibrium? The virtuous
circle of credibility, low interest rates and low debt service will begin if financial markets
believe a priori that government will be tough on inflation. By adopting the euro and thus
renouncing control over monetary policy this would indeed be the case.
Introducing Turkey into the eurozone would complement Turkey’s EU accession process in
two ways. Through the adoption of the euro and the shift to a higher equilibrium, the Turkish
government could redirect expenditure towards more constructive ends. Lower expenditure
on debt servicing would entail considerable budgetary gains. Resources would be thus freed
for the Turkish government to redirect towards the real economy and in particular towards the
                                                                
38 Gros, D. (10/1999), ‘Who Needs and External Anchor’ preliminary and incomplete, and Gros, D.
and Steinherr, A. (2001), Economic Transition in Central and Eastern Europe, forthcoming.NATHALIE TOCCI
32
economic development of the south-east. As noted above all of the economic development
plans proposed by governments in recent years were in part hampered by budgetary restraints.
The economic rehabilitation of the south-east together with accompanying political reforms
with regards to the Kurdish population would move Turkey towards a satisfaction of the EU’s
Copenhagen political criteria. This would in turn boost Turkey’s accession process.
Second, Turkey’s inclusion into the eurozone prior to membership would boost its accession
process by allowing Turkey’s virtual EU membership in the monetary as well as in the trade
policy sphere. This would confirm to Turkey the Union’s commitment towards its future
accession and encourage Turkey’s full transition towards Europe.
It should be noted that at a conference in Florence in June 2001, Economy Minister Kemal
Derviº suggested a unilateral adoption of the euro prior to Turkey’s full EU membership
39.
Derviº mentioned the idea of euroisation in five years time once low inflation is achieved.
The argument above suggests this could occur much sooner.
4.2 European Security and Defence Policy
40
Devising a formula for the accommodation of Turkey in European Security and Defence
Policy structures could represent the second fundamental pillar of a European strategy for
Turkey. Turkey’s role in the nascent ESDP has been a matter of ardent dispute between
Turkey and the EU for several months. Turkey pledged 4-5,000 troops to the Rapid Reaction
Force and as a former WEU associate member is determined to participate in ESDP decision-
making procedures
41. Having been denied participation; Turkey vetoed the  EU’s assured
access to NATO assets for crisis management. An understanding may have been reached at
the NATO foreign ministers’ meeting in Budapest on 29-30 May 2001. This could lead
Turkey to drop its veto within NATO.
What are Turkey’s demands? Turkey demands the same role in European security and
defence decision-making as it enjoyed within the WEU. In 1992 Turkey, together with
Iceland and Norway (i.e., the other non-EU European NATO countries), became an
associate member of the WEU. This allowed it to:
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(…) take part on the same basis as full members in WEU military operations to which
they commit forces (…). The right to speak brings with it the possibility to present
proposals. Full participation will include participation in caucuses subject to the same
rules as for participation in the meetings of the WEU Council and other bodies.
42
In practice this entailed a well-integrated role of associate and observer members into the
WEU structure concerning non-Article 5 activities, although only the 10 member states had
full decision-making rights in WEU. In addition, associate members were also involved in
side-institutions or activities of the WEU such as the Parliamentary Assembly, the Institute
for Security Studies or the Satellite Centre. This prevented the creation and perception of
insiders and outsiders in the overall institutional set-up of the organisation.
At the NATO Washington Summit of 1999 the Heads of State and Governments stated that:
We acknowledge the resolve of the European Union to have the capacity for autonomous
action so that it can take decisions and approve military action where the Alliance as a
whole is not engaged (…). NATO and the EU should ensure the development of effective
mutual consultation, co-operation and transparency, building on the mechanisms existing
between NATO and the WEU (…) We attach the utmost importance to ensuring the
fullest possible involvement of non-EU European allies in EU-led crisis response
operations, building on existing consultation arrangements within the WEU (…). (…) the
concept of using separable but not separate NATO assets and capabilities for WEU-led
operations should be further developed.
43
Moreover, in the Strategic Alliance the Heads of State agree that:
(…) on a case-by-case basis and by consensus, to make its assets and capabilities
available for operations in which the Alliance is not engaged militarily under the political
control and strategic direction either of the WEU or as otherwise agreed, taking into
account the full participation of all European Allies if they were so to choose.
44
Well after the Washington summit, the EU refused to offer the same role to the former WEU
associate members. Turkey was offered full participation in  decision-shaping process and
operational planning, i.e. the day-to-day management of an EU-led operation. Turkey, as a
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non-EU member, was not offered participation in  decision-making. In particular the EU
rejected Turkey’s:
•  participation on the same basis as full members in EU military operations to which they
commit forces;
•  right to speak and with it the possibility to present proposals;
•  full participation in caucuses subject to the same rules as for participation in the meetings
of the General Affairs Council and other bodies, i.e. Political and Security Committee.
The discrepancy is clear. Turkey had a certain position within the WEU, allowing it to broker
power. Turkey was promised at the NATO Summit in Washington in 1999 that the EU should
build on existing mechanisms of the WEU. In the process of building a credible Rapid
Reaction Capability, the EU stated its right to an “autonomous decision capacity” and is thus
not willing to go as far as the WEU did in engaging its associated members. Turkey has
pledged 4-5,000 troops to the Rapid Reaction Force and thus demands inclusion in ESDP
decision-making procedures in the way it was included in the WEU.
The failure of the EU to build upon the existing consultation arrangements within the WEU
provides the general legal context for Turkey’s demands. However, Turkey’s insistence upon
this issue can be explained by more substantial reasons. First, Turkey’s accession to the EU is
still a long-term prospect. NATO countries such as Poland and the Czech Republic whose
accession to the Union will occur over the next three to four years are in a relatively
unproblematic position. They will effectively begin participating in the Union’s ESDP in its
early days. However, countries like Turkey or Norway whose EU accession lies either in the
distant future or is not foreseen for the time being are left in a more complex situation. Hence,
both Turkey and Norway as former WEU Associate states would prefer to be included in
ESDP decision making as well as decision shaping.
Second, Turkey, unlike Norway, lies in a volatile and unstable geographical position.
Although the future ESDP is likely to take a global view of security issues, its major theatres
of operation are likely to be in problem areas in and around Europe.  NATO’s work on
potential scenarios point to sixteen potential areas for the deployment of the RRF. Thirteen of
these hotspots lie around Turkey and thus critically affect its security. In particular Turkey
fears a European defence involvement in Cyprus. Cyprus has historically been one of the top
foreign policy priorities in Turkey. Furthermore, over the decades and in particular since theREDEFINING TURKEY-EU RELATIONS
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1990 application of the Republic of Cyprus to the EU, Turkey and the Union have taken
increasingly diverging positions on the conflict. Given opposing political positions on this
question, Turkey is adamant not to transfer these political divergences to the security domain,
which could occur with the creation of an ESDP from which Turkey is excluded.
Third, the incomplete transfer of the WEU institutional set-up to the EU also entails an
effective downgrading of Turkey’s status in European security affairs. Under the ESDP,
Turkey would not be able to participate automatically in European military exercises and in
the whole array of side-institutions such as the Institute for Security Studies and the Satellite
Centre. Moreover, it would have to withdraw from several European security activities such
as MAPE policing in Albania, to which Turkey is an active contributor. Withdrawal from
such security initiatives in the Balkans, an area of considerable security interest to Turkey
would be clearly unacceptable to the latter.
Given the general legal context and Turkey’s pressing security concerns outlined above, a
formula for Turkey’s accommodation within ESDP should be found. Such a formula could
represent another ideal element of a European Strategy. Turkey’s accommodation within
ESDP is also crucial because it would prevent an additional psychological feeling of
exclusion in Turkey. Given the different mechanisms of inclusion under the WEU
institutional framework, failing to accommodate Turkish concerns in ESDP would enhance
the feeling of rejection. In Turkey’s eyes the current EU position illustrates the Union’s
general lack of credible commitment towards this candidate country. If the EU is indeed
serious about its accession process towards Turkey why does it reject the WEU institutional
structure? Arguably, accommodation within ESDP is vital to the Union’s credibility in the
eyes of this candidate member. Enhancing credibility through accommodation in ESDP would
in turn both strengthen the perceived commitment of the EU towards Turkey, and by
encouraging political change in Turkey, it would speed up Turkey’s full EU accession.
Which formula could both be acceptable to European legal principles and address Turkish
concerns? An understanding may have been reached at the NATO foreign ministers’ meeting
in Budapest on 29-30 May 2001. Discussions were based on Turkish, British and US
proposals to accommodate Turkey in ESDP. Discussions concerned first, Turkish
participation in EU military exercises. Second, greater frequency of EU consultations with the
6 non-EU European Allies. Third, the presence of Turkish military officers in the EU Military
Staff. Finally, a consideration of Turkish national security interests. A distinction would beNATHALIE TOCCI
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made between strategic and non-strategic NATO assets made available to the EU and between
the geographical locations where those assets would be deployed. The EU would have assured
access to non-strategic assets. But in the case of strategic assets such as fuel pipelines,
intelligence and command and control structures, necessary for hard security operations, the
EU would need NATO approval on a case by case basis. NATO member Turkey would thus
be given a de facto veto right over these operations. Areas in Turkey’s national interests such
as the Aegean, Cyprus and possibly Nagorno Karabakh effectively would be excluded from
EU-led operations.
If progress was made along these lines, this would indeed be a momentous step forward. A
complementary proposal could be that of including some or all of these elements in a
‘Security Agreement’ between Turkey and the EU. The Schengen Agreement was an
intergovernmental agreement concluded outside the EU framework. In the 1997 Treaty of
Amsterdam, the agreement was included in the EU  acquis.  Its purpose is to remove all
controls at internal land, sea and airport frontiers. On 26 March 2001, the five Nordic
countries (Sweden, Finland, Denmark, Norway and Iceland) entered the Schengen Agreement
and thus officially entered part of the EU. This enables these countries to maintain the Nordic
Passport Union, which allows their citizens to move freely across their borders. However,
Norway and Iceland remain non-EU members. They are not allowed a veto within the
Council of Ministers and if a decision were taken by the Council that was then rejected by
their national parliaments, the agreement would collapse.
This model of an inter-governmental agreement either outside or within the EU Treaties could
be translated to the security sphere. One could foresee a European intergovernmental
agreement on external security. Two variants are possible: 1) EU member states engage in
such an intergovernmental agreement with Turkey, or 2) the EU itself agrees upon a bilateral
agreement with Turkey. The elements included in such an agreement could be variants of
those discussed at the NATO Budapest meeting.
4.3 Foreign policy in the Caucasus
A final component of a Turkish ‘European strategy’ could foresee foreign policy co-operation
in a region like the Caucasus. Below it will be argued that the potential roles of the EU and
Turkey in the Caucasus could be strongly complementary. Hence, foreign policy co-operation
in this region could represent a final and effective element of a European Strategy for Turkey.REDEFINING TURKEY-EU RELATIONS
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The EU is becoming increasingly preoccupied with its policies vis-à-vis its periphery, lying
on and beyond the enlargement territories. The future borderlands of the EU, more often than
not afflicted by chronic instability and poverty, will require a consistent and comprehensive
set of EU policies aimed et exporting the latter’s stability and prosperity to its neighbours. But
the EU is not ready for a substantial and prominent role in the South Caucasus. At the 1999
OSCE Istanbul Summit all of the leaders of the South Caucasus as well as former President.
Demirel called for a Stability Pact for the Caucasus, which would involve the three south
Caucasus states, the three neighbours (Russia, Turkey and Iran) and the other two main
players (EU and US). The EU, while acknowledging the appeal of such an initiative has been
cautious in its response, in the light of its extensive commitments in the Balkans. Europe’s
attitude vis-à-vis the Caucasus has been one of ‘benign indifference’.
45 The Union has kept a
low political profile in the Caucasus, and its policies have been applied indiscriminately to the
Caucasus and to Central Asia. Furthermore, EU budgets for the Caucasus are consistently
being cut. With the EU Troika Mission to the South Caucasus in February 2001, Union
interest in the region has risen. Nonetheless, at this stage it is still unclear whether this will
mark a short-term visible increase in EU attention to the South Caucasus.
Turkey instead is already present in the South Caucasus and could play a fundamental role in
its political and economic development. Yet it cannot do so as an independent actor. Turkey
directly borders all three South Caucasian countries and has strong linkages both to its ethnic
brothers in Azerbaijan and Central Asia and with other Caucasian peoples including the
Adjarians in Georgia and the  Karachai,  Kabardins and  Balkars in the North Caucasus.
Particularly since the collapse of the Soviet Union Turkey has taken an active interest in the
area. Turkish schools have emerged in Azerbaijan and Central Asia and Turkish entrepreneurs
have invested in Karachai-Cherkessia and Kabardino-Balkaria contributing to the economic
development of these impoverished Russian Republics. Turkey has also acted as a model for
Caucasian Islamic countries, as a westernising and secular Muslim country. Finally, Turkey
plays a central role in the development of Caspian oil and gas, with the most notable example
being the planned Baku-Ceyhan oil pipeline and the adjacent gas pipeline which has emerged
as a realistic prospect with the recent Azeri gas finds. However, Turkey’s positive potential in
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the region is hindered by its partial position in the region and in particular its economic
blockade on and lack of diplomatic relations with Armenia.
Hence, Turkey’s potential economic and political roles in the Caucasus and the EU’s half-
hearted recognition of the region’s importance but partial inability and unwillingness to take a
more active and direct lead could neatly dovetail each other. The Union’s political
involvement in the region could have considerable impact without a substantial increase in
economic assistance through its co-operation with Turkey. This naturally requires an
immediate normalisation of Turkish-Armenian relations. The Turkish blockade of Armenia
has arguably damaged Turkish interests. It has radicalised the attitudes of Armenia and the
Armenian Diaspora, who have successfully lobbied for a renewed discussion on the 1915
Armenian ‘genocide’ in the US, France, Italy and European Parliament. Furthermore, the
blockade has harmed Turkish reputation abroad while not effectively stopping Turkish
Armenian-trade, where many Turkish goods are successfully sold in Armenia after being
smuggled through Georgia or Iran. Turkish businessmen have frequently signalled their
eagerness to officials to legally trade with their Armenian neighbours.
Even with a normalisation of Turkish-Armenian relations, the potential of Turkey’s
constructive role in the Caucasus is hampered by the country’s non-neutral position on the
Karabakh conflict. However, its collaboration with the EU in this area of foreign policy would
increase Turkey’s credibility in its propositions for a multilateral co-operative initiative in the
region. The complementarity in EU and Turkey’s foreign policies in this region is self-evident
and should be exploited to the full through the actualisation of a Stability Pact for the
Caucasus involving both the EU and Turkey as well as other external actors.
46 The prospect of
such an initiative would greatly increase if an agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan
over Nagorno Karabakh is found soon.
Within the framework of such a multilateral co-operative initiative Turkey and the EU could
devise strategies for mutually reinforcing roles. Such co-operation would not only strengthen
relations between Turkey and the Union. It would also accustom Turkey to the norms,
standards and practices of EU foreign policy making. Finally, it would encourage a
normalisation of Turkey’s relations with Armenia, an implicit requirement of the EU towards
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its applicants as set out in its Agenda 2000.
47 Co-operation in this field would thus
complement Turkey’s accession process by anchoring Turkey more strongly to Europe and
encouraging political changes in Turkey in the foreign policy sphere which would in turn
accelerate its accession to the EU.
5.  Conclusions
In this paper an analysis of the Turkish political context attempted to explain the some of the
critical political issues in Turkey repeatedly mentioned by European officials. An awareness
of this context appears to be of fundamental importance for two principal reasons. First, it
highlights the extent of change Turkey would have to undertake in order to comply with EU
norms and enter the EU. Second, it suggests that in order for the EU to formulate adequate
and realistic policies towards Turkey an awareness of the country’s overall political context is
an absolute prerequisite.
So far EU policies have by and large made realistic and desirable recommendations to
Turkish decision-makers. Yet its policies of conditionality have suffered from a profound lack
of credibility. Hence, this paper’s suggestions on how the current policy of EU accession
could be complemented by an additional ‘European strategy’ for Turkey. Closer cooperation
and inclusion in areas such as trade, monetary, security and foreign policies could serve both
as a formula to enhance relations between the two partners and accelerate Turkish democratic
reform in the 21
st century.
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